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must be remembered that law in democracy will have only the respect it deserves. Adaptation according to democratic principle, the growth and development in which democratic progress consists, must ever be the concern of those who know how to distinguish between what is vital and what is merely incidental and temporary; it is those who can really help. Liberty is not to be saved by the lusty shoutings of the street; it needs the discipline and courage of the soldier, the probity and intelligence of the industrious and high-minded official, the undying love of a people instinct with patriotism, the song and the cheer and the ardor of the multitude, but beneath all these and unescapable is the constant working of economic forces with which we must reckon. The adjustment to preserve liberty requires the best training which special studies can furnish, and while all effort at progress under law must be inspired by the idealism of our people, it cannot be successful, at least without great losses through mistaken ventures, save by the service of experts. These are the guardians of the truth which cannot be found on the surface, but lies deep in the mine of thought and experience requiring rare skill for its discovery and extraction. And it is the truth alone that can keep you free.

## THE BRITISH EMPIRE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND THE UNITED STATES

**I**N *The Round Table*, perhaps the most authoritative of the quarterly reviews of the policies of the British Commonwealth, the leading article in the March number has for its title, "The British Empire, the League of Nations and the United States." This article, covering thirty-one pages, is, in certain respects, one of the most noteworthy utterances we have read out of Britain. It begins by picturing conditions of Europe, particularly of the British Empire, politically and economically. It argues: "If the British nations cannot devise the means for formulating and pursuing a common policy in defense of law and peace, there is little prospect that other nations, divided by language and history as well as by wide differences of outlook and interest, will succeed where we have failed."

One section is devoted to the refusal of the United States to ratify the Treaty and the Covenant.

The next section concludes: "There is nothing peculiar in this attitude. It is merely, we repeat, the broad reflex of an attitude already taken up by all the European Allies in questions where their national interests are affected, and also by the British Dominions in their relations with the British Government. It gives us a statement, in plain English, of limitations to the ideal of international action which none of the other Allies will, in practice, dispute. So far, therefore, from destroying the League of Nations, the American reservations have rendered it the great service of pointing clearly to the flaws which at present neutralise its worth."

In the next section occurs this significant statement: "The recognition of the Dominions as individual nations in the League of Nations, important advance as it is, has therefore not completely solved the political and

constitutional problem by which they are faced. The Dominions are being committed once again by international negotiations in which they take no part. They will be confronted again, sooner or later, by the choice between repudiating their membership in the British Commonwealth or accepting the consequences of action taken single-handed by the British Government. To ignore this dilemma is to walk blindfold toward a precipice.

"It follows from this that the machinery of the League of Nations is inadequate by itself as a means to uniting the sense and good-will of the democracies of the British Commonwealth for the maintenance of peace. The League of Nations is at work as best it can now. The Dominions are members of the League. But the Turkish treaty is nevertheless being negotiated by the British Government without interest or assistance on the part of the Dominion governments. That simple fact means volumes, and it would be folly to blind ourselves to its significance."

The conclusions set forth in the final section will give to our readers the substance of this illuminating British utterance.

The conclusions which we have sought to point in the preceding sections of this article may now be summarised. They are three in number:

"1. The first is a general warning against the assumption, even more widespread in the Dominions than in Great Britain, that we have already successfully solved the very difficult political and economic problems bequeathed by the war. This assumption is particularly misleading with regard to finance. Its danger lies not only in the fact that we are still producing too little to balance our expenditure, and therefore living beyond our means; it lies even more in the critical financial and economic condition of Europe, with whose welfare our own is inextricably intertwined. The purely economic and financial problem is discussed in another article, and we need only direct attention here to its political corollary. The British democracies are all much engrossed in projects of domestic reconstruction, which must entail a heavy strain on our resources, already taxed to the uttermost. A very large number of political authorities assure us that we must concentrate on these domestic problems, because failure to deal with them may precipitate social and industrial trouble of a very serious kind. It is, indeed, difficult to overrate the importance of such questions as those which are being pressed by the unions of the Triple Alliance in Great Britain—the coal miners, the transport workers, and the railway men. There is a wide demand for government expenditure and government control on a large and increasing scale. We only ask those who press these demands to look to the state of the world in general as well as to the more familiar situation at home. Nothing is more likely to cause industrial upheavals in the British Empire than a further rise of prices, which may easily be accompanied by a set-back in trade. The whole world is still living beyond its means, and we must seek to strengthen our own financial position by every possible means if we are not to be involved in a period of world-wide depression, misery, and unrest.

"2. Our second conclusion arises from the set-back of

British hopes in the League of Nations and the treaties of peace. The settlement of Europe under the peace treaties is in some parts insecure, and the Allies are clearly unable to live up to all their obligations under the covenant. It is misleading to attribute this state of affairs solely to financial improvidence or to the refusal of the United States to accept the Peace of Versailles. Both these factors in the situation are symptoms rather than causes, and they are due to the fact that the Peace of Versailles and the covenant of the League of Nations overlooked the practical conditions of European reconstruction and overstepped the limits of international partnership. The course of events since the signature of peace has shown that national sentiment is too strong to accept the limitations imposed upon it by the covenant. The reservations of the American Senate in this respect are only a plain statement of views and feelings shared in reality by all the other signatories of the peace. We ourselves, for instance, have undertaken obligations in the covenant which those who need our support may interpret more literally than we do ourselves. This is an equivocal position. While the main lines of the peace are sound, the covenant is both too vague and too precise. In principle the signatories combine for joint action on an imposing scale; in practice their national freedom of action is left intact. The American Senate has stated in plain English that, so far as the United States is concerned, national freedom of action is not in any way to be camouflaged or compromised. The British Empire should state its own position in equally clear terms.

"3. Our third conclusion deals with the relation between the League of Nations and the British Commonwealth. The recognition of the British Dominions as individual members of the League has not only committed them to obligations far larger than their democracies realize or will be willing to discharge; it has also obscured the fact that our imperial relations, in default of some better machinery for imperial co-operation than the League itself presents, are slipping back into the very vice of centralization which we all wish to correct. The attitude of the British Dominions toward co-operation within the British Commonwealth is exactly parallel to the attitude of foreign nations to co-operation within the League. In both cases the fear of impairing national independence is stronger than the desire for united action in pursuit of common aims; and in the British Empire the fear of centralization has been such that it has led the Dominions to undertake unawares a series of responsibilities toward foreign States far greater than they are willing to undertake toward Great Britain and the British Commonwealth. While insisting, moreover, on the forms of national independence, they are missing the substance of national responsibility in foreign affairs. Great Britain continues, of necessity, to deal unaided and unadvised with broad questions of international policy in which the Dominions are vitally concerned. The Dominions are being bound by decisions in which they take no present interest, and there is no available means for securing united and representative action on behalf of the whole British Empire in world affairs. Yet the unity of the British Commonwealth is essential to the influence of the League of

Nations for order and good-will, and its example will set the rate of progress in international action for decades to come. If the British nations, with all their ties of interest and sentiment, cannot act together in world-affairs, it is not likely that foreign nations, deeply divided by history, by temperament, by forms of government, by national outlook, and by divergent aims, will be able to succeed where the British nations have failed.

"To what course of action do these conclusions point?

"They point, in the first place, to revision of our obligations under the League. We are at present pledged to guarantees of territorial arrangements in Europe which may be challenged at any time by forces too powerful for diplomatic control, and it is becoming evident that in no part of the Empire would public opinion sanction our active interference in the local disputes which may ensue. The Polish corridor to Danzig is a case in point. The local territorial problem does not engage our interest, and British democracy would not be moved to action by it unless roused by some unmistakable challenge to international faith and right. If the United States had accepted the obligations which President Wilson approved in signing the covenant, the situation would have been different, for the combined moral and material influence of the British Empire and the United States would have presented a serious obstacle to breaches of the European settlement in any form. The American Senate has, however, made it perfectly plain that the obligations embodied in the covenant go much beyond the responsibilities which American opinion is prepared to undertake, and we cannot honestly pretend that our own democracies will be willing in practice to go any further than the democracy of the United States. Our proper course is to revise and restate our position toward the League in accordance with these facts.

"The public opinion which has made itself manifest in the United States in this connection is not very different in reality from ours, and ours may be stated broadly in two sentences: First, we wish to do our utmost to guarantee peace, liberty, and law throughout the world without committing ourselves to quixotic obligations to foreign States. Second, we wish to assist and develop the simpler mechanism of international dealing embodied in the League without mortgaging our freedom of action and judgment under an international covenant. Our policy toward the League should therefore be revised on the following guiding lines:

"1. We should state definitely that our action within the League will be governed solely by our own judgment of every situation as it arises, and we must undertake no general obligations which we may not be able or willing, when the test comes, to discharge.

"2. We must in no case commit ourselves to responsibilities which we cannot discharge to the full with our own resources, independent of assistance from any foreign power.

"3. We must definitely denounce the idea that the League may normally enforce its opinions by military or economic pressure on recalcitrant States. It exists to bring principals together for open discussion of international difficulties, to extend and develop the mechan-

ism and habit of international co-operation, and to establish an atmosphere in which international controversies may be settled with fairness and good-will. These are the essential limits of international action in the present state of national sentiment throughout the world, unless and until the conscience of the nations is once more challenged by some flagrant violation of international right.

"The important thing is to enable the League of Nations to make a reasonable start with the co-operation of the United States. With the less ambitious objects defined above it will sooner or later secure the whole-hearted support of American opinion, and it will begin its work with far greater prospects of success than under a covenant to which no power is really able or willing to subordinate either its national opinion or its essential interests.

"So much for the revision of our obligation toward the League. It is not the only practical step to which our conclusions point, for even more important, if those conclusions are sound, is the maintenance of British unity of action in international affairs. We have seen that the League cannot itself take the place of some such mechanism as the Imperial War Cabinet, which provided for continuous consultation and co-operation, not only in the war, but during the negotiation of peace. The influence of the League of Nations upon British Imperial relations has for the moment been misleading and dangerous. In form, it has given the Dominions a new national status, recognized by all the signatories of the covenant, though qualified in one important particular by a reservation of the United States. The danger of this status is that, without some adequate organ for united British action in world affairs, it must, in the long run, prove either separatist in character or else entirely formal and illusory. For the present it is—by the self-chosen policy of the Dominion governments—illusory. Those governments are appending their signatures to treaties in the negotiation of which they have taken absolutely no part, and they are leaving decisions which must gravely affect their future in the unaided and overlaid hands of the British Government. It is only a question of time before this situation leads to an incident of some kind which will provoke the bitterest recrimination and controversy. If the critical diplomacy which led up to our declaration of war on Germany in 1914 has taught us one lesson above all others, that lesson is that the foreign policy of the British Empire cannot be democratic and representative in any adequate degree unless some means are found for continuous consultation and co-operation by ministers responsible to all the British parliaments. Yet the moral of 1914 is being ignored. Content with a formal status in the partnership of nations, the Dominions have forced the old measure of responsibility upon Downing Street, which has to act alone for the whole Empire because there is once again no adequate mechanism for imperial co-operation in foreign affairs, and action of some kind cannot be postponed indefinitely.

"The road to closer co-operation is not at present clear, but in due course it must be found. The democracies of the Empire have yet to realize what the present situation means. The issue is in their hands, and time is

necessary for the realities of their present equivocal status to sink into their minds. A constitutional conference will be necessary in the next few years in order to decide whether or not the British Commonwealth is to have the means of united influence and action in safeguarding the peace and order of the world. In the meantime it is the duty of good citizens in all parts of the Commonwealth to look the situation in the face and think out its implications for themselves."

## THE CANONS OF FORCE

By HENRY W. PINKHAM, Winthrop, Mass.

WAR is often called the use of force. The euphemism lends itself to confusion and error. The word war has itself become euphemistic; such are its associations with noble ideals, as honor, self-sacrifice, courage. Always to call war exactly what it is, namely, collective homicide, would help powerfully to abolish the ghastly thing. Of course, pacifists, even the most thoroughgoing, do not object to all use of force in the sense of physical coercion. Tolstoi is said to have declared that he would refrain from physical interference even if he saw a ruffian about to kill a child. Perhaps he thought so, but one may be permitted to believe that a test would have shown him mistaken. Emerson wisely declined to tell what a man should do in difficult and extreme cases, saying, "Nature and God will instruct him in that hour." Mr. Roosevelt's method of confuting the pacifists was to ask, "What would you do if a ruffian should slap your wife's face?" He insisted that all who believe in police, if only they are logical and possessed of brains enough to think the matter through, must also believe in armies and navies. "Policing the nations" is very serviceable as a euphemism for war.

### Three Canons

Until the divine law is written on the hearts of all men, when all will find in obedience to that law their perfect freedom, a certain amount of forcible control will be necessary. By what marks can desirable control be distinguished from that which is injurious?

Three canons of force are here suggested to the readers of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE*: Compulsion should be exercised (1) only by those who are unmistakably superior in wisdom and goodness, (2) only by those who are overwhelmingly stronger, and (3) only upon individuals.

The discipline of young children sometimes demands, quite in accordance with these three rules, physical compulsion. The child's inexperience may endanger its welfare, or even life, and call for coercion by its elders, because of their greater knowledge, as the indispensable safeguard of the child's future. The physical control of young children by their parents involves no injury to either, such is the great disparity of strength. When, however, the boy has reached his later teens and is almost as heavy as his father and a good deal quicker, the old man should be content with moral suasion. If he tries physical force he may get licked, or both father and son may be seriously hurt.